Organizing for "wicked problems" – analyzing coordination arrangements in two policy areas

Internal security and the welfare administration

Per Lagreid and Lise H. Rykkja
*Department of Administration and Organization Theory,
University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway*

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to address the question of coordination by comparing two recent reforms schemes in Norway: internal security and the welfare administration. Both concern typically transboundary "wicked" policy problems where horizontal and vertical coordination is difficult. What kind of coordination problems did the reforms address, what kind of coordination solutions were provided, and what can explain the observed pattern?

Design/methodology/approach – The paper draws on organizational theory, distinguishing between a structural-instrumental and a cultural-institutional perspective. A comparative case study design is applied. The analysis combines insights from four large research projects.

Findings – Both cases represent broad government efforts to tackle "wicked" coordination problems when there is a mismatch between the problem structure and the organizational structure. In both cases, reorganization and structural changes resulted in hybrid and complex organizational arrangements. The welfare administration reform tried to solve a tension between ministerial responsibility and local self-government by introducing One-stop-shops. Within the area of internal security, coordination problems related to lacking ministerial capacity was tackled by introducing a formal principle of collaboration, a lead agency approach and network arrangements.

Practical implications – Effective coordination might ease wicked problems by enhancing the understanding of the problem and its underlying causes, increasing the probability of finding agreed-upon solutions and help implementation. Enhanced communication and strengthened mutual trust and commitment among actors might be a positive outcome. However, coordination implies dilemmas and trade-offs, and reformers often have to balance different interests.

Originality/value – The paper shows that different instruments of coordination are central for handling "wicked problems".

Keywords Norway, Coordination, Internal security, Welfare administration

Paper type Research paper

Introduction

Major public policy challenges of our time, ranging from welfare issues to the problem of dealing with internal security, are frequently seen as "wicked problems" where coordination between actors and organizations with different tasks and perceptions is crucial (Head, 2008; Rittel and Webber, 1973). Coordination is also a long debated issue within public administration, and as public administration has become an increasingly multi-actor and multi-level entity, coordination across levels of government and policy sectors remains salient. A renewed interest in coordination is triggered by recent so-called post-New Public Management (NPM) reforms, fuelled by a commitment to

resolve complex policy problems and an increased recognition that the existing specialization – largely brought on by NPM-oriented features – has trouble handling problems that transcend organizational boundaries, administrative levels and ministerial areas or "silos" (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007).

The framing of certain problems as "wicked" highlights their complexity, ambiguity, uncertainty and the lack of agreement on how to deal with them. These multifaceted policy problems defy simple solutions and straddle the borders of organizations and ministerial areas of responsibility as well as administrative levels (Lægreid *et al.*, 2015). By definition a wicked problem has no optimal solution, but more or better collaboration and coordination is often seen as a key precondition for governments to address complex governance challenges and therefore also as the way forward (Head and Alford, 2013). These coordination efforts assume numerous shapes and go under various names, such as integrated governance, joined-up government (Bogdanor, 2005; Hood, 2005), holistic governance (6 *et al.*, 2002), new public governance (Osborne, 2010), networked government, partnerships, horizontal management, collaborative public management (Gregory, 2003), collaborative governance (Ansell and Gash, 2008) and whole-of-government (OECD, 2005).

In this context, a number of scholars have argued that there has been a shift from coordination and steering by hierarchy towards more network arrangements, and that hierarchical governance is being replaced by collaborative arrangements (Rhodes, 1997; Kooiman, 2003; Torfing *et al.*, 2012), while some (for instance Lynn, 2011) question whether this is actually the case. Partnerships and collaborative networks often rely on inherently soft measures, informal relationships and trust, devised to "nudge" different organizations towards moving in the same direction and overcome "siloization" (Lægreid *et al.*, 2014). However, in many cases networks and hierarchy exists side-by-side (Kjær, 2004) and a central question is whether a "shadow of hierarchy" is necessary for the efficacy of policy-making and policy performance (Héritier and Lehmkuhl, 2008). There are also more "hybrid" arrangements. For example, the concept of a "lead agency" has been introduced as an intermediate form between traditional hierarchies and networks (Boin *et al.*, 2014).

We address the question of coordination by examining two cases from Norway: internal security and the welfare administration. Both concern typically "wicked" policy problems where horizontal coordination, between different sectors, and vertical coordination, between central and local government, is a major challenge. Recent reforms have tried to deal with these coordination problems. Our research questions are:

RQ1. What kind of coordination problems do these reforms address and what kind of coordination solutions is provided?

RQ2. How can we explain the observed pattern?

Our theoretical approach draws on organizational theory, where we distinguish between a structural-instrumental and a cultural-institutional perspective (Christensen *et al.*, 2007).

In both cases, two distinct organizing principles of the Norwegian polity constrain coordination: The ministerial rule and the principle of local self-government. With individual ministerial responsibility the cabinet minister bears the ultimate responsibility for the actions of her ministry and its subordinate agencies. The minister therefore tends to be focused on policy issues within the portfolio of the ministry. This enhances vertical coordination within the ministerial area but constrains horizontal coordination across

policy areas or "sectors". The principle of local self-government implies that municipalities carry important collective tasks and that the importance of municipal government is widely recognized among citizens as well as national political elites (Aars and Fimreite, 2008). This facilitates coordination within the municipalities but constrains coordination between central and local government, whereas the central government cannot directly steer the priorities of the municipalities. The result is coordination problems along both the vertical and the horizontal dimension.

The paper proceeds with a section on coordination and "wicked problems" in public policy and administration. We then present our theoretical approach, data and research design. Thereafter, we elaborate on the two empirical cases in order to give some context to the following empirical analysis. Lastly, we present the main components of the reforms and discuss main findings.

Dealing with wicked problems

Reforms and organizational innovations addressing "wicked" problems and coordination challenges have recently been introduced both within the area of internal security and welfare. Within internal security, a lead agency approach was introduced to supplement the traditional ministerial hierarchy and co-existing network arrangements. Within the welfare administration, a major reform (the NAV-reform) introduced partnership agreements between the state and the municipalities and established One-stop-shops in each municipality.

While it is emphasized that wicked problems have no solution, coordination is correspondingly seen as an endemic concern in public administration (Bouckaert *et al.*, 2010; Hood, 2005; Kavanagh and Richards, 2001; Ling, 2002). Coordination has been framed as a "philosopher's stone" (Gulick, 1937; Jennings and Krane, 1994), especially in a time characterized by increased government expansion and more multi-level, multi-organizational and fragmented governmental apparatuses (Bache and Flinders, 2004). Traditionally, public sector organizations have adopted a narrow "silo" approach that fails to consider transboundary challenges that cut across traditional responsibilities, such as long-term unemployment and social deprivation (Pollitt, 2003) – or internal security (Fimreite *et al.*, 2014). This "pillarization" of the public sector has increased in the NPM era (Gregory, 2006; Pollitt, 2003) rebadging the classical function and area question in public administration. The principle of "single-purpose organizations", with many specialized and non-overlapping roles and functions, has produced fragmentation, self-centred authorities and a lack of cooperation and coordination (Boston and Eichbaum, 2005, p. 21; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). This has been followed by a new orientation towards increased integration and coordination through post-NPM initiatives (Osborne, 2010).

Coordination is a contested and ambiguous concept. We adhere to the definition by Verhoest and Bouckaert where coordination is seen as the purposeful alignment of tasks and efforts of units or actors in order to achieve a defined goal (Verhoest and Bouckaert, 2005). The aim is generally to create greater coherence in policy and to reduce redundancy, lacunae and contradictions within and between policies (Peters, 1998). In practice it is a complex matter, involving policy-making as well as service delivery, management and the implementation of policies (Bouckaert *et al.*, 2010).

Coordination demands arise from increasing specialization and the division of labour (Gulick, 1937; March and Simon, 1993) and specialization and differentiation increases the need for coordination (Thompson, 1967; Mintzberg, 1979; Bouckaert *et al.*, 2010). Coordination challenges vary depending on type of specialization (Gulick, 1937):

where public administration is based on the principle of purpose, tasks or sector, the main challenge will be to get different sectoral administrations to work together on cross-sector problems. Under specialization by geography, coordination between administrative levels is a main challenge. How coordination is achieved and what administrative tools are chosen to this end differs. Reformers often have to select between equally attractive but logically incommensurate alternatives; between coordination for efficiency vs coordination for reliability, for instance (Wildavsky, 1987). Coordination instruments are thus based on judgments between competing values (Lindblom, 1965). From a public policy perspective, this makes them interesting to study more closely.

In the two cases, we expect there are similar coordination challenges related to the overall political administrative characteristics of the country. In essence, these are vertical challenges related to the coordination between the central state and the local municipalities and horizontal challenges related to coordination between different policy sectors. At the same time, coordination challenges will differ depending on the problem structure. Distinct constellations of coordination instruments may therefore be prominent within different policy areas.

A renewed interest in coordination is triggered by the increased specialization associated with the expansion of NPM, emerging through so-called post-NPM reform measures (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). These post-NPM reforms are characterized by partnerships and cooperation via networks – introducing softer measures in contrast to more hierarchical tools of command and control associated with "old" public administration (Lægreid et al., 2014). This is paralleled by centralization efforts under the rubric of "reassertion of the center" (Dahlstrøm et al., 2011). The result is often more hybridity (Christensen and Lægreid, 2011).

The increased focus on coordination is linked to increasing emphasis on complexity and "wicked problems". Wicked problems typically transcend organizational boundaries, administrative levels and ministerial areas. They are complex, multi-level, multi-actor and multi-sectoral; involve uncertain and contested knowledge and are ambiguous regarding priorities and world-views. Arguably, they therefore enhance the need for contingent coordination, collaborative governance and network approaches (Ansell, 2011; Kettl, 2003). Typical examples are social cohesion, climate change, unemployment, security, crime, homelessness, healthcare, poverty and immigration. These issues demand interconnected administrative responses. The problem is that there often is a mismatch between the problem structure and the available organizational structures (Clark and Steward, 2003; O'Flynn et al., 2011).

Our two cases are analyzed through two analytical perspectives derived from organizational theory: a structural and a cultural perspective. The purpose is to discern to what degree the two perspectives can explain the choices that are made in terms of organizational structure and coordination instruments in the two cases, in essence how the two policy areas have developed over the recent years.

A structural-instrumental perspective directs attention towards formal arrangements and coordination by architecture (Christensen et al., 2007; Hood, 2005). The perspective assumes that the formal-normative structure of public administration influences decision-making processes by channelling attention, shaping frames of references and attitudes among decision-makers acting under the confines of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957; March and Simon, 1993; Scott, 2003). Coordination will mainly relate to vertical specialization and attention is towards how authority and patterns of accountability and control emanate from one's position in the formal hierarchy.

Here, decision-making processes are largely seen as the result of hierarchical steering from the top. This is linked to a Weberian conceptualization of bureaucracy, seen as an administrative technology characterized by hierarchy, specialization and management by rules (Weber, 1947). Formal organization is mainly an instrument to achieve goals, and channels the models of thought and decision-making behaviour of civil servants (Egeberg, 2012). The underlying behavioural logic is a "logic of consequence" (March and Olsen, 1989), implying that leaders score high on rational calculation and political control (Dahl and Lindblom, 1953). They have relatively clear intentions and goals, choose structures that correspond with these goals, have insight into the potential effects and the power to implement their decisions.

A distinction can be made between a hierarchical variant of the structural perspective, where the leaders' control and rational calculation is central, and a negotiation variant, allowing for a variety of interests and compromises (March and Olsen, 1983). The principle of ministerial responsibility builds on a hierarchical approach. In general it results in strong line ministries with well-built capacities for vertical coordination, but rather weak horizontal coordination (Hood, 1976). Such strong vertical coordination may produce coordination deficits and multi-organizational sub-optimization. It can also produce management pathologies, such as departmentalism, tunnel vision and vertical silos. This typically makes horizontal coordination difficult.

A cultural-institutional perspective emphasizes informal norms, values and practices institutionalized over time. Central organizational features result from mutual adaptation to internal and external pressure that creates cultural institutionalized identities (Selznick, 1957) and path-dependency (Krasner, 1988), explained by "logic of appropriateness" (March and Olsen, 1989). Administrative traditions represent "filters" producing different outcomes in different contexts (Olsen, 1992). A high level of mutual trust tends to enhance appropriate behaviour, and individual and organizational decision-making is oriented towards confirming roles and identities (March and Olsen, 1989, 2006). This may facilitate or constrain coordination. Although change is largely constrained, major crises can produce a "punctuated equilibrium" implying a shock effect that can alter institutionalized beliefs and give way for more radical transformation (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). The new post-NPM reform-discourse emphasizing the importance of partnerships and collaboration across departmental boundaries presumes changing cultural attitudes (Christensen and Lægreid, 2007). However, the prospects for forging coordination through intermediate institutional arrangements can according to the cultural perspective be expected to vary according to context, and might depend on the degree of cultural compatibility with established identities and political-institutional legacies (March and Olsen, 1989).

Data and methods
Our analysis builds on data collected in four research projects: "Multilevel governance in the tension between functional and territorial specialization" which focused on the policy area of internal security and crisis management (NRC-project No. 174614); a process evaluation within the national evaluation of the welfare administration reform (the NAV-reform); "Reforming the Welfare State: Accountability, democracy and management" which addressed accountability relations in welfare administration reforms (NRC-project No. 202504); and a project on "Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS)" (EU FP7 Grant No. 266887). Both authors were central participants in these projects. The analysis combines insights from data collection

and analysis in the four projects. This includes, relevant for both cases analyzed here, document analysis of white papers, government proposals to parliament, expert reports, public committees, inquiry commissions, evaluation reports, parliament minutes, literature reviews and interviews with centrally placed reform agents, political and administrative executives and practitioners, as well as a survey to top civil servants. The document material is too vast to refer in detail here. An overview is available from the respective research projects and in the related publications. In total, more than 50 qualitative interviews were conducted by several participants in the four projects. The survey covered top civil servants from 18 countries, working in central government and the sectors of health and employment. Coordination and reform was a central topic both in the interviews and in the executive survey.

A comparative case study enables us to explore differences and similarities. Yin (2003) describes how multiple case studies can be used to predict either similar or contrasting results, but for predictable reasons. Our cases have several similarities. They both cover wicked, transboundary issues where there is a mismatch between organization and problem structures. They concern administrative or structural reforms, and are situated within one country, providing a fairly stable administrative, cultural and political environment. There are also apparent differences between the cases. They cover distinct policy areas with distinct problems. The NAV-reform represents one of the largest contemporary administrative reforms in Norway. The internal security reforms have been much more incremental and cautious. The two cases also differ in terms of scope. While the internal security case mainly addresses horizontal coordination at the central level, the welfare administration reform tried to strengthen both horizontal coordination at the central level and vertical coordination between local and central level. The following empirical analysis will portray characteristics concerning the dominant coordination arrangements in the Norwegian polity and within the two policy areas.

Coordination in the Norwegian polity

We focus on coordination arrangements in two cases from different policy areas within one country. Therefore, it makes sense to provide some country background. Norway has a strong democratic tradition and collectivist and egalitarian values are important. Consensus is crucial, the level of internal conflicts is low and corporatist arrangements are well developed. Although there are some tensions between administrative levels, the government's leeway in the two policy areas is rather large compared to other countries: per capita income and the level of labour market participation is high and the unemployment rate is one of the lowest in Europe. Also, Norway has largely been spared the experience of major and devastating disasters with the exception of the terrorist attacks in Oslo and at Utøya in July 2011 (Christensen et al., 2013).

Coordination is a central discussion in Norwegian public policy and administration (Christensen and Lægreid, 2008), and is central also to the two policy areas (Rykkja and Lægreid, 2014). The principles of individual ministerial responsibility and local self-government have important bearings on coordination and policymaking-leeway within different policy areas. The ministerial rule emphasizes vertical and hierarchical coordination, creates powerful sector ministries and results in weaker horizontal coordination across policy areas (Lægreid et al., 2013; Bouckaert et al., 2010). Sector ministries in Norway are substantially stronger than ministries responsible for sector-crossing activities (with the exception of the Ministry of Finance). Local authorities are responsible for providing a broad range of services and the local democratic

tradition and independence is strong. This means that horizontal coordination within each municipality is strong, but that there are tensions between central state and local government.

Organizing for "wicked problems"

Internal security – towards a lead agency model

A range of public authorities has responsibilities for internal security in Norway and the policy field is frequently described as fragmented, resulting in major coordination problems (Fimreite *et al.*, 2014; Lango *et al.*, 2011). This is generally attributed to the main steering principles; the principles of responsibility, similarity, proximity and collaboration, a rather weak coordinating Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJ), and also constrained by the principles of ministerial rule and local self-government (Rykkja and Lægreid, 2014).

The responsibility principle states that the actor responsible for a certain activity under normal conditions is also responsible for that activity during a crisis. The principle of proximity states that a crisis should primarily be handled where it occurs, by those who are closest to it. However, in complex crises and in crises that cross sectors and administrative levels, it sometimes becomes unclear who should take the lead. Due to this, the notion of a lead agency has been a central and recurrent topic of discussion within the policy area (Lango *et al.*, 2014).

Several initiatives to strengthen the Ministry of Justice's leading role and coordination capacity have been put forward. In 2003, the Directorate for Civil Protection was established as an overarching capacity assisting the Ministry, responsible for national preparedness plans and crisis management. It oversees other authorities responsible for internal security, but struggles to achieve proper authority, especially *vis-à-vis* more powerful sector authorities. Another central cross-sector authority is The National Security Authority, responsible for countering major security threats; primarily espionage, sabotage and acts of terrorism. It reports to the MJ in civil matters, but is administratively placed under the Ministry of Defence. This creates potential conflicts regarding competency and priorities, readily admitted by those working within the authority and the ministry (NOU, 2012).

In recent years, the MJ has gradually moved towards a lead coordinative role at the central level, but still struggles to attain necessary authority and coordinating capacity (Rykkja and Lægreid, 2014). The notion of a lead agency is an intermediate form between traditional hierarchy and network that is normally responsible for organizing the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of policy related to a particular operation. It typically chairs an interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to this operation and normally determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the involved agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions. It is also associated with a traditional hierarchical approach as the agency's function is to impose control on others within a network (Boin *et al.*, 2014).

Two additional organizations were set up to foster better crisis coordination in 2006: The Government Emergency Management Council (GEMC) and the Government Emergency Support Unit (GESU). The GEMC is the superior administrative coordinating body in particularly demanding and complex crises. The GESU was set up to assist the affected authorities in a crisis. Both are cross-sector or network organizations. The GEMC consists of permanent members (Secretary Generals) from six ministries. The GESU is an administrative capacity within the MJ that serves whichever ministry or public authority that is involved in a crisis. Both can be expanded upon need.

Both organizations encountered severe capacity and coordination problems in the management of the terrorist attacks in July 2011 (NOU, 2012; Rykkja and Lægreid, 2014). After the terrorist attacks, they have become more established: the GEMC is supposed to meet regularly, also when there is no crisis, and the GESU has become a permanent unit within the Ministry which is operative 24/7.

Despite continuous debate, upgrading the MJ's authority and coordination capacity has been slow and rather cautious (Rykkja and Lægreid, 2014). The principle of collaboration, introduced after 2011, prescribes that all public authorities are responsible for securing collaboration with other authorities and organizations in the crisis management process. However, central documents state that this does not challenge the overriding principle of responsibility, whereby each line ministry is responsible for societal security and civil protection within their own portfolio. This leaves a rather ambiguous situation. A critical report by the General Auditors Office in 2015 found serious shortcomings in the Ministry's coordination capacity (Riksrevisjonen, 2015).

Hence, coordination continues to be a major challenge (Christensen *et al.*, 2015). The administrative apparatus is a conglomerate of semi-autonomous and loosely coupled organizations, each with a life of their own. Coordination by hierarchy has largely taken priority, although supplemental network structures such as the GEMC and the GESU have been strengthened. Recent policy documents continue to call for more coordination, however, and the role of the relevant agencies – especially the Directorate for Civil Protection – is still somewhat unresolved. The collegial bodies and network organizations suffer from unclear mandates, ambiguous authority, limited resources and weak governance tools. Thus, dominant specialization principles, coordination mechanisms and standard operating procedures constrain the attention and affect the way the different authorities work in practice.

Although there has been considerable reshuffling activity in the formal arrangements in this policy area over the last 20-30 years, the main governance principles have not been challenged. The development has been cautious and reluctant, even after major crises such as the terrorist attacks in 2011. There is a tension between existing lines of specialization by sector and the newer efforts to establish cross-boundary coordination, and a trade-off between internal coordination within each ministerial area and external coordination between policy areas. The lead agency model is introduced to handle the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity that permeate the policy area. Additional network structures enhance complexity. Creating a balance between hierarchy and network arrangements to ensure proper response and commitment and control as well as necessary coordination seems to be the "holy grail" of this policy area. Whether or not the lead agency approach and the additional network arrangements are viable organizational innovations begs for more analysis and research.

Welfare and employment – formal partnerships and One-stop-shops
In 2005 a new central welfare administration and the first One-stop-shops for welfare and employment was established at the municipal level in Norway. This was one of the largest public sector reforms in recent Norwegian history. The aim was to increasing the administration's capacity to address "wicked problems" by integrating existing policy fields and administrative levels, to increase work participation and to make the administration more user-friendly, holistic and efficient (Christensen *et al.*, 2007).

One major challenge was institutional fragmentation. Users with complex problems, the multi-service users, were the main targets. By merging central institutions in

different ministries and at separate administrative levels, the idea was to create more coordinated services. The reform faced important problems in the initiation phase. Merging established agencies with separate cultures, tasks and professions; establishing constructive cooperation between the central and local authorities; and creating a coordinated front-line service with user-oriented offices across the country was difficult.

The reform established joint One-stop-shops in each municipality through a formal partnership between the state responsible for pensions and employment benefits, and the local authorities responsible for social services. The One-stop-shops were supposed to appear as a single entrance to the employment and welfare-administration services, provide services "close to the user" and coordinate a range of different state and municipal benefit schemes. The One-stop-shops represented an effort to ensure both horizontal and vertical coordination. A central motivation was also to create a new profession of generalist case workers in the front-line offices.

The NAV-reform demanded considerable resources. Horizontal coordination and the central level merger went relatively smoothly, but the establishment of a constructive cooperation between the central and local authorities proved difficult. Coordination of the frontline services in local NAV offices had to be implemented through a step-by-step integration. In the end, local NAV offices reported to both the municipality and the central government. This created rather ambiguous responsibility lines. Also, the leadership at the local level worried that the arrangement would limit local autonomy even though they were rather satisfied with the One-stop-shops within their own community . All in all, the local partnerships and offices are struggling to deliver on the main reform goals (Askim *et al.*, 2009), implying a loose coupling between the strategic and the operative level; Førde and Danielsen, 2015).

The One-stop-shops were introduced to solve the tension between the principle of ministerial responsibility and the principle of local self-government, but proved difficult to implement. Countering the ideal of being an agreement between equal partners, the central government soon took the upper hand. From 2008 a more hybrid profile emerged with the establishment of specialized management and pension units at the regional level (Christensen and Lægreid, 2012). The case handling process became more specialized and the ideas of a general profession and powerful local offices incorporating a broad scope of activities and services were partly been left behind. The aim of the reform was to enhance the integration and coordination but it ended up with specialization and division of labour more similar to the situation before the reform (Andreassen and Aars, 2015). Thus there are still tensions between vertical coordination along the central-local government divide and horizontal coordination across different tasks (such as employment and pensions).

Discussion

Considering internal security, the terrorist attacks in 2011 revealed a longstanding need for more focused attention, central leadership, authority and coordination. Providing the necessary powers in the form of adequate tools and sanctions to ensure control, follow-up and implementation and rewards to ensure commitment, were crucial assets. Examining the developments over time shows that the primary structures still stand strong, however, even though there has been a pronounced call for coordination – especially after 2011. The principle of ministerial responsibility has not been up for discussion. The government has tried to weaken the silo-effect by building secondary structures: first, by establishing collegial network arrangements for cross-boundary

information sharing and discussion, and second by introducing a lead agency approach. A general problem with network arrangements is that they largely involve part-time participants with a loyalty to their primary position. Furthermore, they often lack a clear mandate, appropriate resources and authority and potent governance tools and their meetings are often irregular.

The MJ has gradually moved towards becoming a lead ministry. The introduction of the lead agency approach without challenging the principle of ministerial responsibility, however, creates ambiguity *vis-a-vis* the semi-independent central agencies within the field. They face considerable obstacles when trying to influence other ministerial areas. This reflects that there are no universal solutions – perhaps more critically so within the area of internal security: crises are difficult to predict and increasingly complex. A certain level of improvisation and organizational flexibility is therefore always necessary.

The establishment of the One-stop-shops and partnerships in the welfare sector reallocated and changed the division of labour through typical hierarchical means. It established new, and changed existing lines of control. The main goals were consciously designed and controlled from the top. The reform also introduced some typical network elements. The partnership agreement alluded to an equal relationship between the state and the local authorities, which was difficult to fulfil (Fimreite and Lægreid, 2009). Also, some of the features of the local NAV offices were voluntary. The establishment of the One-stop-shops can be seen to represent a joining-up at the base. However, the NAV-reform also implied joining-up at the top, through the establishment of the new employment and welfare administration under the Ministry of Labour. Guidance, control and evaluation were mainly top-down. Overall, the horizontal integration between employment and pensions worked better than the vertical relationship (Christensen *et al.*, 2013) and the coordination seems to work better in small One-stop-shops than in bigger (Andreassen and Aars, 2015).

The two cases portray some important similarities. Both are examples of broad government efforts to tackle wicked problems and solve central coordination problems in situations where the problem structure does not seem to fit the organizational structure. The problems are largely tackled through reorganization and structural change. The solutions are hybrid and represent complex organizational arrangements. The welfare administration reform tried to solve the tension between the principle of ministerial responsibility and local self-government by introducing One-stop-shops. Within the area of internal security, coordination problems related to ministerial responsibility was tackled by introducing a principle of collaboration, network arrangements and a lead agency approach. The impacts of the reforms in both policy areas are uncertain, however. Finding a close relation between the goals of the reforms and how the organizational arrangements work in practice has been difficult, and the effects of the organizational reforms on performance are ambiguous.

There are also important differences. Within internal security, the main problem is horizontal coordination. Within social welfare and employment, the main challenge is vertical coordination – between local and central government. There has been movement towards more and better coordination between levels and sectors in both cases, but these are rather demanding and time-consuming processes. The NAV-reform was more of a "big bang" reform, while the reforms within internal security have been less extensive. In both cases, the effects and results are rather difficult to measure. In the case of NAV, there has been a large-scale government initiated evaluation. There has not been a similar systematic science-based evaluation concerning internal security. Our research suggests

that, especially in the field of internal security, there is need for more knowledge on processes and effects of new organizational arrangements.

According to a structural-instrumental perspective, formal organization and plans matter. Our research shows that the organization for internal security cannot be seen as the result of a coherent, planned and pure hierarchical coordinated procedure. Generally, there has been more agreement about the problem structure than about the organizational structure. Coordination problems are largely tackled through the establishment of secondary structures, collegial bodies, boards, councils, networks, informal areas and collaborative arrangements. These supplementary arrangements challenge existing organizational forms but do not overturn them. They are often temporary, without a clear mandate and, designed to avoid negative coordination. The lead organization approach is constrained by actors with their own interests and authority. This implies that negotiations between different interests matter alongside hierarchy, and that political and value conflicts are important for motivating change.

The structural-instrumental perspective is also only partly supported when we look at the NAV-reform. The reform represents a complex mixture of specialization by purpose or tasks and geography, combining hierarchy and networks in a complex multi-level system. The partnership model represents the network element, while hierarchy still extends from the Ministry via the central agency to the regional units and below. An organizational model that implies the use of both networks and hierarchy at the same time is challenging.

Our analysis reveals two reform processes that have produced complex solutions that in different ways attend to a balance of principles of specialization and coordination. The resulting complexity reflects that hierarchical efforts to control reform processes are constrained by problems of rational calculation. Expected effects are difficult to fulfil, and the overall instrumental performance of the new system has not lived up to the expectations.

A cultural-institutional perspective predicts that organizational arrangements develop according to the established institutional culture. In the case of internal security, our analysis shows that the institutionalized tradition of ministerial responsibility continues to stand strong and constrains efforts to strengthen horizontal coordination. Even in the face of a major shock, there have only been minor organizational changes. This supports the view that established arrangements and institutions are infused with values, identities, traditions, culture and established routines and rules. The institutions and the civil servants who work in them do not easily adjust to changing external pressure or signals from political executives. Thus, path dependent processes and political and institutional conflicts characterize the policy area.

Internal security is a policy area that often does not get attention from politicians unless there is a major crisis. Thus, political conflicts mostly play out within the institutional structures and among civil servants defending their institutional territory. In line with the concept of bounded rationality the executives seem more preoccupied with minimizing decision-making costs than with maximizing goal attainment. They tend to search for solutions close to previous ones, favouring the status quo. Embedded institutional arrangements, such as the principle of ministerial responsibility, therefore constrain future administrative arrangements. Powerful line ministries defend their portfolio, and the MJ remains a ministry with rather little discretion and enforcement authority. The Ministry's role as a coordinator and driving force has only been exploited to a small extent, and the change process is characterized by strong

veto players. The result is institutional change characterized by layering, where new, but cautious, organizational arrangements have been added to existing ones.

The cultural-institutional perspective can also explain the decision-making structure in the case of the welfare administration, at least partially. The process can be interpreted as competing types of appropriateness (Christensen *et al.*, 2007): The Parliament argued that merging the three services into a more holistic structure was the most appropriate solution. The experts, following a professional identity, saw few reasons to support the merger, however. The government deemed it appropriate to focus chiefly on the multi-user problem, but dared not touch the local responsibility for the social services. All actors were concerned that cultural traditions would hamper the desired effects and stressed the need to develop a shared culture. Creating a generalist street-level profession turned out difficult, however, both due to different professional identities and the large task portfolio. The reform agents wanted enhanced integration but got instead specialization due to path dependencies from old problem definitions and appropriate solutions anchored the previous administrative arrangements (Andreassen and Aars, 2015).

This analysis confirms earlier studies showing that post-NPM reforms are characterized by combination, complexity, layering and hybridization (Christensen *et al.*, 2007; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Public sector reforms do not necessarily replace each other. Instead, new reforms are added to old ones. Administrative reforms can therefore be understood as compound, combining different organizational principles and being based on multiple factors working together in a complex mix (Egeberg and Trondal, 2009). They are multi-dimensional and represent "mixed" orders, combine competing, inconsistent and contradictory organizational principles and structures that co-exist and balance interests and values (Olsen, 2007).

Both reforms aim to strengthen coordination. Our analysis shows that that they face dilemmas and trade-offs between different dimensions of coordination. Reforms that enhance coordination for efficiency does not necessary enhance coordination for reliability, and coordination for impartiality and equal treatment might be at odds with coordination for local flexibility and discretion – as shown in the NAV-reform. Coordination for internal security might have to be balanced against coordination for individual rights. Thus, coordination often implies value judgments. Both policy areas represent a mix of traditional Weberian bureaucratic traditions, NPM-elements and whole-of-government characteristics. The question is then not "either hierarchy or networks", but how the particular mix of coordination forms develop, and how the trade-off between hierarchy and network arrangements is altered. This underlines the need to go beyond the idea of a single organizational principle to understand how public organizations work and are reformed.

It also illustrates that post-NPM does not represent a coherent set of ideas and tools. It is more an umbrella term describing a group of responses to the problem of increased fragmentation, towards more integration, coordination and governance capacity, support for policy implementation and a (re-) strengthening of political and central control (Baechler, 2011; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; Ling, 2002). A common feature is the notion that working across organizational boundaries will enable more efficient and effective policy development, implementation and service delivery, go beyond the minimum form of coordination involving non-interference ("negative coordination", as coined by Scharpf, 1997) towards more "positive coordination", i.e. building greater coherence to achieve better government performance.

Joined-up-government initiatives, such as the NAV-reform and the reforms we have seen within the field of internal security, have a strong positive symbolic flavour.

They introduce "magic concepts" such as partnerships, collaboration, or lead agencies (Pollitt and Hupe, 2011), but they do not always work as intended. The "silo" mentalities that these reform initiatives are supposed to bridge might also exist for good reasons (Page, 2005). Well-defined vertical and horizontal organizational boundaries should not only be seen as a symptom of obsolescent thinking (Pollitt, 2003). Division of labour and specialization are inevitable features of modern organizations. This implies that coordinative initiatives will continue to be problematic. Although working horizontally is sometimes very important, it is also a time- and resource-consuming activity.

The two coordination reforms have also improved the ability of the government to cope with the wickedness of the two policy fields. They are both examples of the typical "wicked issue" problem of coordination "underlap" implying that the policy field falls between jurisdictional boundaries of different government organizations so that it becomes the responsibility of no one (Wegrich and Stimac, 2014; Koop and Lodge, 2014). Merging agencies and establishing a mandatory partnership in the welfare administration and introducing the lead agency model in the field of societal security have altered the jurisdictional boundaries and reduced the gap between problem structure and organizational structure. The result is coordination with a greater degree of both voluntarism and formalization. In the welfare administration it was rather mandatory and formal, while in the case of societal security case it was more informal and voluntary.

Coordination approaches are central instruments for handling "wicked issues". Effective coordination might ease wicked problems in three ways (Head and Alford, 2013; Ansell and Gash, 2008; Head, 2008). First, it enhances the understanding of the problem and its underlying causes. Second, it increases the probability of finding agreed-upon solutions. Third, it makes it easier to implement solutions. Overall increased collaboration and coordination will normally increase communication and strengthen the degree of mutual trust and commitment among actors (Bardac, 1998). Thus collaboration and coordination is a way of recognizing the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity of wicked transboundary problems involving multi-level and multi-sector actors.

Conclusion

The case studies in this paper illustrate how different instruments are used to address coordination problems in different policy areas. Bringing public sector and societal actors together has not been an easy task, and outcomes are mixed. Both cases have produced several potentially transposable lessons, however.

One lesson concerns the importance of political context. In Norway, there is a constant tension between central state power and local authority and autonomy. There is also a tension between hierarchical and network arrangements reflected within both the welfare administration and the internal security policy area. In the case of the welfare administration, the One-stop-shops were based on fixed, regulated and binding cooperation between central and local government and partnerships were incorporated in mandatory local agreements. Here, there was a trade-off between the state's need for standardization and the municipalities' need for local adaptation and flexibility. In the case of internal security, there is a constant tension between the need for local crisis management capacity and central supervision, control and leadership in more demanding and transboundary crises.

Our analysis shows that coordination also addresses broader issues such as participation, legitimacy, trust, power and political control. Certain instruments may be

efficient in terms of resources used or how quickly results are achieved, but unsatisfactory from the perspective of stakeholder inclusion and legitimacy. It is therefore often difficult for a single arrangement to yield positive results all round, and normally trade-offs have to be made (Hood, 1991). Adding to this, as wicked problems they are multi-dimensional, poorly bounded, vaguely formulated and not easy to break down. Strategies for handling wicked problems include collaboration and coordination but also adaptive leadership and enabling structures and processes (Head and Alford, 2013). To deal wisely with wicked problems different governance capabilities are needed such as capability to deal with multiple frames, to adjust actions to uncertain changes, to respond to changing agendas and expectations and to unblock stagnation (Termeer *et al.*, 2015).

Accountability relationships become increasingly complex and hybrid in situations where the government acquires a more horizontal and multi-level character (Michels and Meijer, 2008). Generally, the horizontal coordinating arrangements seem to supplement rather than replace traditional hierarchical coordination. This produces more complex organizational arrangements. The cases analyzed here demonstrate this kind of hybridity. There is also a kind of pragmatism behind these solutions (Ansell, 2011). Instead of replacing hierarchy, a combination of elements and types of organization are adopted – combining structural-instrumental and cultural-institutional elements. In practice, therefore, the distinction between hierarchical and network-administrative modes of coordination is rather subtle.

One conclusion is that network structures hold promises for wicked and crosscutting policy problems, but do not by themselves resolve them. Coordination implies dilemmas and trade-offs. Reformers often have to balance different and alternative coordination measures. The expansion of network arrangements does not necessarily imply that hierarchies are no longer operative, or that all participants are essentially given an equal voice (Moynihan 2005; O'Leary and Bingham, 2009). The mixed design we observe in both our cases supports an understanding of public administration as constituted on a diverse repertoire of co-existing, overlapping and potentially competing, organizational principles (Olsen, 2010). As Provan and Kenis (2008) argue, there are important dynamics between hierarchy and networks. Increasingly secondary affiliations – network arrangements with part-time participants – complement primary affiliations linked to the officials' main positions in the hierarchy (Egeberg, 2012). It is difficult to achieve enhanced horizontal coordination on central level and local level at the same time (Egeberg and Trondal, 2015). Thus, hybrid coordination arrangements are operative and relevant, as we have seen both within internal security and the welfare administration in Norway. Unpacking them, and understanding the dynamics within them, seems an important way forward for public administration research.

References

6, P., Leat, D., Seltzer, K. and Stoker, G. (2002), *Towards Holistic Governance: The New Reform Agenda*, Palgrave, New York, NY.

Aars, J. and Fimreite, A.L. (2008), "Local government and governance in Norway: stretched accountability in network politics", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 8 No. 3, pp. 239-256.

Andreassen, T.A. and Aars, J. (2015), *Den Store Reformen (the Big Reform)*, Universitestforlaget, Oslo.

Ansell, C. (2011), *Pragmatist Democracy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Ansell, C. and Gash, A. (2008), "Collaborative governance in theory and practice", *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 543-571.

Askim, J., Christensen, T., Fimreite, A.L. and Lægreid, P. (2009), "How to carry out joined up government reforms: lessons from the 2001-2006 Norwegian welfare reform", *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 32 No. 12, pp. 1006-1025.

Bache, I. and Flinders, M. (2004), *Multi-Level Governance*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Baechler, J. (2011), "Moving from 'why' to 'how': critical success factors for whole-of-government initiatives that link security and development issues", paper presented at the 6th ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, 25-26 August.

Bardac, E. (1998), *Getting Agencies to Work Together; The Practice and Theory of Managerial Craftsmanship*, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, B.D. (1993), *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.

Bogdanor, V. (Ed.) (2005), *Joined-Up Government*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Boin, A., Busuioc, M. and Groenleer, M. (2014), "Building European union capacity to manage transboundary crisis. Networked or lead agency model?", *Regulation & Governance*, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 418-436.

Boston, J. and Eichbaum, C. (2005), "State sector reform and renewal in New Zealand: lessons for governance", paper presented at the Conference on Repositioning of Public Governance: Global Experiences and Challenges, Taipei, 18-19 November.

Bouckaert, G., Peters, B.G. and Verhoest, K. (2010), *The Coordination of Public Sector Organizations: Shifting Patterns of Public Management*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2007), "The whole-of-government approach to public sector reform", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 67 No. 6, pp. 1059-1066.

Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2008), "The challenge of coordination in central government organizations: the Norwegian case", *Public Organization Review*, Vol. 8 No. 2, pp. 97-116.

Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2011), "Complexity and hybrid public administration – theoretical and empirical challenges", *Public Organization Review*, Vol. 11 No. 4, pp. 407-423.

Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (2012), "Competing principles of agency organization – the reorganization of a reform", *International Review of Administrative Science*, Vol. 78 No. 4, pp. 579-596.

Christensen, T., Fimreite, A.L. and Lægreid, P. (2007), "Reform of the employment and welfare administrations – the challenges of co-coordinating diverse public organizations", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. 73 No. 3, pp. 389-409.

Christensen, T., Fimreite, A.L. and Lægreid, P. (2013), "Joined-up government for welfare administration reform in Norway", *Public Organization Review*, Vol. 37 No. 2, pp. 171-195.

Christensen, T., Lægreid, P. and Rykkja, L.H. (2013), "After a terrorist attack: challenges for political and administrative leadership in Norway", *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 167-177.

Christensen, T., Lægreid, P., Roness, P.G. and Røvik, K.A. (2007), *Organization Theory for the Public Sector: Instrument, Culture and Myth*, Routledge, London.

Christensen, T., Danielsen, O.A., Lægreid, P. and Rykkja, L.H. (2015), "Comparing coordination structures for crisis management in six countries", *Public Administration*. doi: 10.1111/padm.12186 (forthcoming).

Clark, M. and Steward, J. (2003), "Handling wicked issues", in Reynolds, J., *et al.* (Eds), *The Managing Care Reader*, Routledge, London, pp. 273-280.

Dahl, R.A. and Lindblom, C.E. (1953), *Politics, Economics, and Welfare*, Harper & Row, New York, NY.

Dahlstrøm, C., Peters, B.G. and Pierre, J. (Eds) (2011), *Steering form the Centre*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto.

Egeberg, M. (2012), "How bureaucratic structure matters: an organizational perspective", in Peters, B.G. and Pierre, J. (Eds), *The Sage Handbook of Public Administration*, 2nd ed., SAGE Publishing, London, pp. 157-168.

Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2009), "National agencies in the European administrative space: government driven, commission driven or networked", *Public Administration*, Vol. 87 No. 4, pp. 779-790.

Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (2015), "Why strong coordination at one level of government is incompatible with strong coordination across levels", working paper, Arena, Oslo, 7 October.

Fimreite, A.L., Lango, P., Lægreid, P. and Rykkja, L.H. (Eds) (2014), *Organisering for samfunnsikkerhet og krisehåndtering. (Organizing for Societal security and Crisis Management)*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo.

Fimreite, L. and Lægreid, P. (2009), "Reorganization of the welfare state administration: partnerships, networks and accountability", *Public Management Review*, Vol. 11 No. 3, pp. 281-297.

Førde, J.S. and Danielsen, O.A. (2015), "Beyond loose coupling in crisis preparedness: an analysis of current and potential role of coordinating agencies in Germany, Sweden and Norway", paper presented at the EGOS Conference, Toulouse, 26-28 August.

Gregory, R. (2003), "All the king's horses and all the king's men: putting New Zealand's public sector back together again", *International Public Management Review*, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 41-58.

Gregory, R. (2006), "Theoretical faith and practical works: de-autonomizing and joining-up in the New Zealand state sector", in Christensen, T. and Lægreid, P. (Eds), *Autonomy and Regulation: Coping with Agenceis in the Modern State*, Edward Elgar, London, pp. 137-161.

Gulick, L. (1937), "Notes on the theory of organization", in Gulick, L. and Urwick, L.F. (Eds), *Papers on the Science of Administration*, Institute of Public Administration, New York, NY.

Head, B.W. (2008), "Wicked problems in public policy", *Public Policy*, Vol. 3 No. 2, pp. 101-118.

Head, B.W. and Alford, J. (2013), "Wicked problems: implications for public policy and management", *Administration & Society*, Vol. 47 No. 6, pp. 711-739.

Héritier, A. and Lehmkuhl, D. (2008), "Introduction. The shadow of hierarchy and new modes of governance", *Journal of Public Plolicy*, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 1-17.

Hood, C. (1976), *The Limits of Administration*, Wiley, London.

Hood, C. (1991), "A public management for all seasons?", *Public Administration*, Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 3-19.

Hood, C. (2005), "The idea of joined-up government: a historical perspective", in Bogdanor, V. (Ed.), *Joined-Up Government*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 19-42.

Jennings, E.T.K. and Krane, D. (1994), "Coordination and welfare reform: the quest for the philosopher's stone", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 54 No. 4, pp. 341-348.

Kavanagh, D. and Richards, D. (2001), "Departmentalism and joined-up government: back to the future?", *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 54 No. 1, pp. 1-18.

Kettl, D.F. (2003), "Contingent coordination: practical and theoretical puzzles for homeland security", *American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 253-277.

Kjær, A.M. (2004), *Governance*, Policy Press, Cambridge.

Kooiman, J. (2003), *Governing as Governance*, Sage, London.

Koop, C. and Lodge, M. (2014), "Exploring the co-ordination of economic regulation", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 21 No. 9, pp. 1311-1329.

Krasner, S.D. (1988), "Sovereignty – an institutional perspective", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 66-94.

Lægreid, P. and Rykkja, L.H. (2014), "One-stop-shops for social welfare: the NAV office in Norway", in Lægreid, P., Sarapuu, K., Rykkja, L.H. and Randma-Liiv, T. (Eds), *Organizing for Coordination in the Public Sector. Practices and Lessons from 12 European Countries*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 78-90.

Lægreid, P., Nordø, Å.D. and Rykkja, L.H. (2013), "The quality of coordination in Norwegian Central Government", Working Paper No. 14, COCOPS, available at: www.cocops.eu (accessed 7 October 2015).

Lægreid, P., Sarapuu, K., Rykkja, L.H. and Randma-Liiv, T. (2015), "New coordination challenges in the welfare state", *Public Management Review*, Vol. 17 No. 7, pp. 927-939. doi: 10.1080/14719037.2015.1029344.

Lægreid, P., Sarapuu, K., Rykkja, L.H. and Randma-Liiv, T. (Eds) (2014), *Organizing for Coordination in the Public Sector. Practices and Lessons from 12 European Countries*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Lango, P., Lægreid, P. and Rykkja, L.H. (2014), "Etter 22. juli. justis- og beredskapsdepartementets ansvar for samfunnssikkerhet", in Fimreite, A.L., Lango, P., Lægreid, P. and Lise, H.R. (Eds), *Organisering for samfunnssikkerhet og krisehåndtering*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, pp. 60-76.

Lango, P., Rykkja, L.H. and Lægreid, P. (2011), "Organizing for internal security and safety in Norway", in Nota, G. (Ed.), *Risk Management*, Intech, Rijeka, pp. 167-188.

Lindblom, C. (1965), *The Intelligence of Democracy*, The Free Press, New York, NY.

Ling, T. (2002), "Delivering joined-up government in the UK: dimensions, issues and problems", *Public Administration*, Vol. 80 No. 4, pp. 615-642.

Lynn, L. (2011), "The persistence of hierarchy", in Bevir, M. (Ed.), *The Sage Handbook of Governance*, SAGE Publications Ltd, London, pp. 218-236.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1983), "Organizing political life. what administrative reorganization tells us about government", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 77 No. 2, pp. 281-296.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1989), *Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics*, The Free Press, New York, NY.

March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (2006), "The logic of appropriateness", in Moran, M., Rein, M. and Goodin, R.E. (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 689-708.

March, J.G. and Simon, H.A. (1993), *Organizations*, 2nd ed., SAGE Publishing, London.

Michels, A. and Meijer, A. (2008), "Safeguarding public accountability in horizontal government", *Public Management Review*, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 165-173.

Mintzberg, H.J. (1979), *The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of Research*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs.

Moynihan, D.P. (2005), "Leveraging collaborative networks in infrequent emergency situation", Collaboration Series, IBM Centre for the Business of Government, 7 October 2015.

NOU (2012), *Rapport fra 22. Juli-kommisjonen*, (Report from the July 22-Commision), Departementenes servicesenter, Oslo.

OECD (2005), *Modernizing Government: The Way Forward*, OECD, Paris.

O'Flynn, J., Buick, J. F., Blackman, D. and Halligan, J. (2011), "You win some, you lose some: experiments with joined-up government", *International Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 34, pp. 213-220.

O'Leary, R. and Bingham, L.B. (2009), *The Collaborate Public Manager*, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC.

Olsen, J.P. (1992), "Analyzing institutional dynamics", *Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxix*, Vol. 2, pp. 247-271.

Olsen, J.P. (2007), *Europe in Search of Political Order*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Olsen, J.P. (2010), *Governance Through Institution-Building*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Osborne, S.P. (Ed.) (2010), *The New Public Governance: Emerging Perspectives on the Theory and Practice of Public Governance*, Routledge, London.

Page, E. (2005), "Joined-up government and the civil service", in Bogdanor, V. (Ed.), *Joined-Up Government*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 139-155.

Peters, B.G. (1998), *Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Co-ordination*, Canadian Centre for Management Development, Ottawa.

Pollitt, C. (2003), "Joined-up government: a survey", *Political Studies Review*, Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 34-49.

Pollitt, C. and Hupe, P. (2011), "Talking about government. The role of magic concepts", *Public Management Review*, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 641-658.

Provan, K.G. and Kenis, P.K. (2008), "Modes of network governance: structure, management and effectiveness", *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 18 No. 2, pp. 229-252.

Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997), *Understanding Governance. Policy Networks, Governance. Reflexivity and Accountability*, Open University Press, Buckingham.

Riksrevisjonen (2015), *Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av Justis- og beredskapsdepartementets arbeid med samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap*, Dokument 3:7 (2014-2015), Riksrevisjonen, Oslo.

Rittel, H.W.J. and Webber, M.M. (1973), "Dilemmas in a general theory of planning", *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4 No. 2, pp. 155-169.

Rykkja, L.H. and Lægreid, P. (2014), "Coordinating for crisis management in Norway after the terrorist attack in 2011", in Lægreid, P., Sarapuu, K., Rykkja, L.H. and Randma-Liiv, T. (Eds), *Organizing for Coordination in the Public Sector. Practices and Lessons from 12 European Countries*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Scharpf, F.W. (1997), *Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*, Westview, Boulder, CO.

Scott, W.R. (2003), *Organizations. Rational, Natural and Open Systems*, 5th ed., Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

Selznick, P. (1957), *Leadership in Administration*, Harper & Row, New York, NY.

Simon, H.A. (1957), *Administrative Behavior*, The Free Press, New York, NY.

Streeck, W. and Thelen, K. (2005), *Beyond Continuity*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Termeer, C.J.A.M., Dewulf, A., Breeman, G. and Stiller, S.J. (2015), "Governance capabilities for dealing wisely with wicked problems", *Administration & Society*, Vol. 47 No. 6, pp. 680-710.

Thompson, J.D. (1967), *Organizations in Action*, MacGraw-Hill, New York, NY.

Torfing, J., Peters, B.G., Pierre, J. and Sørensen, E. (2012), *Interactive Governance*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Verhoest, K. and Bouckaert, G. (2005), "Machinery of government and policy capacity: the effects of specialization and coordination", in Painter, M. and Pierre, J. (Eds), *Challenges to State Policy Capacity: Global Trends and Comparative Perspectives*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 92-111.

Weber, M. (1947), *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, The Free Press, New York, NY.

Wegrich, K. and Stimac, M. (2014), "Coordination capacity", in Lodge, M. and Wegrich, K. (Eds), *The Problem-solving Capacity of the Modern State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 41-62.

Wildavsky, A. (1987), "Choosing preferences by constructing institutions. A cultural theory of preference formation", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81 No. 1, pp. 3-22.

Yin, R.K. (2003), *Applications of Case Study Research*, 2nd ed., Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.

Further reading

EU FP7 grant no. 266887. "Coordinating for cohesion in the public sector (COCOPS)", research project funded by the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme, available at: www.cocops.eu (accessed 7 October 2015).

NRC-project no. 174614. "Flernivåstyring i spenningen mellom funksjonell og territoriell spesialisering", the Norwegian Research Council, available at: www.forskningsradet.no/prognett-demosreg/Projects/1224698133633 (accessed 7 October 2015).

NRC-project no. 202504. "Reforming the welfare state: accountability, democracy and management", the Norwegian Research Council, available at: http://rokkan.uni.no/sites/rtws/ (accessed 7 October 2015).

Corresponding author
Professor Per Lagreid can be contacted at: per.lagreid@aorg.uib.no